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Abstract 
 
This paper attacks an account of Kant's controversial distinction between "free" 
and "dependent" beauty.  I present three problems—The Lorland problem, The 
Crawford Problem, and the problem of intrinsic relation—that are shown to be a 
consequence of various interpretations of Kant's distinction.  Next, I reconstruct 
Robert Wicks' well-known account of dependent beauty as "the appreciation of 
teleological style" and point out a key equivocation in the statement of Wicks' 
account: the judgment of dependent beauty can be thought to consist in 
comparing any two objects' teleological styles either in respect of how or in 
respect of how well each realizes a common purpose. I argue that this 
equivocation forces Wicks into a dilemma: either he must assert the 
impossibility of ugliness or he must assert that the judgment of dependent 
beauty is reducible to the judgment of perfection. Either way, he denies 
important theoretic desiderata.   
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the "Analytic of the Beautiful" Kant draws a controversial 
distinction between "free" beauty and "dependent" or "adherent" beauty:   
 
There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) or merely 
adherent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens).  The first presupposes no 
concept of what the object ought to be; the second does presuppose such a 
concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it.  The first are 
called (self-subsisting) beauties of this or that kind; the latter as adhering to 
a concept (conditional beauty), are ascribed to objects that stand under the 
concept of a particular end. . . . Flowers are free beauties. . . . But the 
beauty of a human being (and in this species that of a man, a woman, or a 
child), the beauty of a horse, of a building (such as a church, a palace, an 
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arsenal, or a garden-house) presuppose a concept of the end that 
determines what the thing should be, hence a concept of its perfection, and 
is thus merely adherent.  (Kant 1790, p. 114) 
 
What tracks the difference between "free" and "adherent" (or dependent) 
beauty is that the latter presupposes, while the former does not, a concept of 
perfection, which entails two related concepts—the concept of "what the 
object ought to be" and “the concept of a particular end.”  Thus, to follow 
Donald Crawford, if Kant's distinction is to be tracked in this way, then the 
distinction between free beauty and dependent beauty should be understood 
as a distinction between distinct kinds of judgment.   
 In order to understand Kant's free/dependent beauty distinction, some 
discussion of the judgment of perfection will be helpful.  Kant distinguishes 
two kinds of objective purposiveness:  
 
Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e. the utility of the object, or 
internal, i.e., its perfection.  (Kant 1790, p. 111)  
 
What is essentially the difference between the two?  Kant says:   
 
To judge objective purposiveness we always require the concept of an end, 
and [if that purposiveness is not to be an external one (utility), but an 
internal one], we require the concept of an internal end, which contains the 
ground of the internal possibility of the object.  (Kant 1790, p. 112)  
 
There are two things to note here.  First, Kant says that judgments of 
objective purposiveness, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, require the concept 
of an end and, secondly, that the difference between the two lies in a 
difference in the kind of end-concept required.  According to Kant 
judgments of utility require an end-concept which is external, while 
judgments of perfection require an end-concept which is internal, to the 
possibility of the object.    
But we may still be unclear about what it is for the concept of an end 
to be either internal or external to the possibility of an object.  Kant states 
the following:   
 
[A] Now as an end in general is that the concept of which can be regarded 
as the ground of the possibility of the object itself, [B] thus in order to 
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represent an objective purposiveness in a thing the concept of what sort of 
thing it is is supposed to be must come first; [C] and the agreement of the 
manifold in the thing with this concept (which supplies the rule for the 
combination of the manifold in it) is the qualitative perfection of a thing.  
Quantitative perfection, as the completeness of any thing in its own kind, is 
entirely distinct from this, and is a mere concept of magnitude (totality), in 
which what the thing is supposed to be is thought of as already determined 
and it is only asked whether everything that is requisite for it exists. (Kant 
1790, p. 112)   
 
Here Kant draws a distinction between two kinds of perfection—qualitative 
and quantitative.  At present we are concerned only with qualitative 
perfection.  As already observed in the citation preceding this one, Kant 
thinks that a judgment of objective purposiveness requires reference to the 
concept of an end.  In the above citation, Kant appears to infer [B] from [A], 
which suggests that a given end-concept is to be regarded as either external 
or internal to the possibility of an object depending on whether the 
determination that the object has a given end, E, presupposes the prior 
determination that it is a thing of a given kind, K.  If it does, then the end-
concept is internal; if not, then the end-concept is external.   
But one might suggest that there are at least two possible directions of 
implication:  on one hand, identifing an object as being of a certain kind K 
may imply that it has such and such a function; on the other hand, 
identifying the function that a thing is supposed to serve may imply that it is 
supposed to be a thing of a certain kind.  Is Kant interested in the function-
to-kind implication or the kind-to-function implication or both?  
Let me illustrate what I think Kant has in mind.  Suppose that I 
observe: "This ashtray makes a good paperweight."  Here I make a 
judgment of utility.  Ashtrays generally are not made to be paperweights, 
although some can be useful as such.  Thus the fact that an ashtray makes a 
bad paperweight does not necessarily make it a bad ashtray because being a 
good paperweight is not the sort of thing that an ashtray is supposed to be.  
Ashtrays are supposed to be things of a different kind, and the kind of thing 
that they are supposed to be is conceptually determined by the characteristic 
function that they are supposed to serve (to collect cigarette remains, say).     
Suppose, however, that I observe "This ballpoint pen writes well."  
Here I make a judgment of perfection.  Functioning as a writing instrument 
is not "external" to [being] a ballpoint pen in the way that functioning as a 
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paperweight is external to being an ashtray.  On the contrary, writing is 
what ballpoint pens are for.  So serving the end of writing is an end-concept 
that is internal to the possibility of a thing's being a ballpoint pen. 
Accordingly, representing x as a good ballpoint pen depends on 
representing x as a thing serviceable for writing.    
Once it is determined that a given object is supposed to be a thing of a 
given kind, K, then an assessment (of the kind referred to by [C] above) can 
be made as to how well the object fulfills its characteristic end, E.  To make 
such an assessment is to make a judgment of qualitative perfection.  When I 
make a judgment of qualitative perfection I essentially judge of a particular 
item that 
(1)  x is a thing of kind K. 
(2)  x, qua K, is supposed to serve such and such a purpose, function, 
      or end.    
(3)  x's being a good K depends on how well x fulfills the end that Ks 
      are supposed to serve.      
Let us call the end a thing has or is supposed to serve in virtue of [its] being 
a thing of kind K its K-determined end.   
Now having briefly discussed the structure of the judgment of 
perfection, let us return to Kant's free/dependent beauty distinction.  Kant's 
distinction has raised a number of important objections, one of which by 
Ruth Lorand.  Lorand claims that if Kant's distinction between free and 
dependent beauty is to be understood as one that implies two distinct kinds 
of aesthetic judgment—those that presuppose a concept of perfection and 
those that do not—then the analysis of aesthetic judgment presented in the 
"Analytic of the Beautiful" can not constitute a single unified theory.  
Instead, Kant is to be understood as giving two distinct analyses, one for 
aesthetic judgments that do take into account a thing's end, and a second for 
those aesthetic judgments that do not.  Call this The Lorand Problem.   
As Dennis Dutton correctly observes, if we take the Lorand Problem 
seriously, we have exactly three exclusive options.  First, we can deny that 
there are judgments of free beauty.  Or, second, we can deny that there are 
judgments of dependent beauty.  Or, third, we assert that there are cases of 
free beauty and dependent beauty and that Kant's aesthetic theory is to be 
understood as a single account of both kinds of aesthetic judgment, and 
subsequently try to resolve The Lorand Problem.  Dutton argues that The 
Lorand Problem is basically insoluble and that therefore we must take the 
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first option.  To assert that free beauty exists, he argues, involves asserting 
the existence of a phenomenon that consists in being a "presuppositionless, 
'self-subsistent' form to be experienced in a conceptual vacuum . . ." (Dutton 
1994, p. 238).   
Dutton's alternative does not enjoy wide support among the 
interpreters of Kant's theory of beauty, and the reason is that there is 
significant textual support against it.  For this reason some interpreters—
notably, Martin Gammon and Henry Allison—maintain that Kant's 
distinction between free and dependent beauty must be upheld; moreover, 
they argue that Kant's distinction can be upheld and The Lorand Problem 
avoided.  This group of interpreters, so-called "complex" or "hybrid" 
theorists, hold that a judgment of dependent beauty consists in a complex, 
the two components of which are a judgment of free beauty and a judgment 
of perfection.  Hence the judgment of dependent beauty is not a distinct 
kind of aesthetic judgment.  Rather it is a conjunction consisting of two 
judgments, one of which is an aesthetic judgment—"x is beautiful"—and 
the second of which is a judgment of perfection—"x realizes (to some 
degree) the end in accord with, or characteristic of, things of kind K."  
The obvious benefit of the complex view is that it does not posit, in 
addition to the judgment of free beauty, a second kind of aesthetic 
judgment, of dependent beauty.  However, there are at least two conditions 
of theoretical adequacy that the theory of judgments of dependent beauty 
must meet.  On the one hand, an account of judgments of dependent beauty 
requires that the imagination enjoy "free play" in its selection of the means 
to a given representational end.  On the other, for an account to be adequate 
it must be capable of showing why making a judgment of dependent beauty 
is not merely to assert the conjunction that "x is beautiful and x is to realize 
the end in accord with being a member of kind K" but to judge that "x is 
beautiful because x realizes an end which is in accord with, or characteristic 
of, things of kind K".  If it is to express more than the sum of the parts of 
the conjunctive judgment, the robust judgment of beauty must assert in 
addition to each of these two components the further judgment that they 
stand in some conceptual or "positive" or "intrinsic" relation. Call the 
problem of showing how judging a thing's perfection can be a determining 
factor to judging its beauty the problem of intrinsic relation. 
The two theories of Kant's free/dependent beauty distinction that most 
directly address the problem of instrinsic relation are the accounts given by 
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Donald Crawford and Robert Wicks.  According to Crawford's account, 
cases of dependent beauty are cases in which the beauty of a thing is a 
function of its perfection.  If an end's "being in accord with" or "being 
characteristic of" a thing of kind K is identical to the end of being a thing of 
that kind, then the beauty I experience in relation to a thing of a kind K will 
be determined by the extent to which it  succeeds in being a thing of that 
kind.  When I judge, for example, that a Porsche Boxer is beautiful, I am not 
merely issuing the judgment, "This is beautiful and this is a Porsche Boxer."  
Rather, the beauty I judge in relation to the vehicle is determined by the 
extent to which it realizes the end of being the kind of vehicle it ought to be.  
So when I judge, "This Porsche Boxer is beautiful," I judge that it is so in 
virtue of the fact that it is a good instance of its make, model and year.   
Crawford's account has been attacked on the basis that it fails to 
satisfy an important theoretical requirement.  While his account seems to 
steer clear of The Lorand Problem, Crawford's account, argues Wicks, 
collapses the distinction between judgments of dependent beauty and 
judgments of perfection.  On Crawford's account, since judging a thing of 
kind K to be beautiful consists in judging it in terms of the degree to which 
it realizes the end of being a thing of that kind, any morphologically sound 
instance of, say, the species "Stinkbug" should be judged to have some 
degree of beauty.  Hence the general problem with Crawford's account is 
that it locates every instance of kind K within a continuum of beauty in 
accord with the particular degree to which each instance of K succeeds in 
realizing the end of being a thing of kind K.  Call this The Crawford 
Problem. 
Wicks praises Paul Guyer's account as "the most convincing and often 
recited interpretation of dependent beauty to date," but his major criticism is 
that Guyer's position fails to adequately address the problem of intrinsic 
relation (Wicks 1997, p. 389).  On Guyer's account, a free beauty judgment 
is made in accord with certain constraints that are imposed on it by a 
judgment of perfection.  When, for example, I issue a judgment of 
dependent beauty in reference to a church, my judgment "presupposes" a 
judgment of perfection—"This building is (to be) a church"—which 
determines a proscribed range of properties—church-frustrating or church-
interfering properties—on which I am not permitted to ground my judgment 
of free beauty.  So in the event that I judge a church to be beautiful, the 
ground of my judgment cannot be the pleasing graffiti, displayed on its 
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walls, because graffiti (regarded as vandalism) is a church-interfering 
property.   
According to Wicks, the problem with Guyer's account is that it fails 
to explain how a judgment of dependent beauty can presuppose a judgment 
of perfection in a "positive" or "intrinsic" way.  For we do not explain why 
x is beautiful on account of the fact that x realizes the end characteristic of 
things of kind K by explaining that our judgment of x's beauty is not based 
on any K-frustrating or K-interfering properties exhibited by x.  Rather we 
want an explanation which shows how x's realizing the end characteristic of 
things of kind K can positively contribute to x's beauty.      
Wicks attempts to steer a course between the accounts of Guyer and 
Crawford.  On the one hand, Wicks wants to enjoy the "intrinsic" or 
"positive" relation that is forged between beauty and perfection in 
Crawford's account, while, on the other hand, he wants to avoid The 
Crawford Problem.  Since Guyer's account avoids reducing dependent 
beauty to perfection, Wicks sees Guyer, not Crawford, as the closer 
theoretical affiliate; however, Wicks claims that since his account of 
dependent beauty does not fail, as Guyer's does, to provide a solution to the 
problem of intrinsic relations, his own account enjoys greater theoretical 
adequacy.     
A second crucial desideratum, however, has been mentioned which 
any theoretically adequate interpretation of Kant's free/dependent beauty 
distinction must also meet.  According to Kant a judgment counts as a 
aesthetic judgment, only if it has the proper "determining ground."  The 
proper ground for aesthetic judgments is an intra-subjective fact that is 
revealed to the subject only through an act of reflection.  The intra-
subjective fact revealed to reflection consists in a harmonious relation 
between the subject's cognitive powers—the imagination and the 
understanding—that Kant describes as "free play."   
In "Dependent Beauty as the Appreciation of Teleological Style," 
Robert Wicks attempts to meet the two crucial theoretic desiderata by 
arguing two claims.  First, "[a] positive or intrinsic relation between beauty 
and perfection is captured by the interpretation of dependent beauty as 
teleological style—call this The Instrinsicness Claim—which asserts that 
his account shows how, in cases of dependent beauty, a thing's perfection 
positively contributes to its beauty (Wicks 1997, p. 393).  Second, Wicks 
claims that his account is free-play preserving.  
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In what follows I argue that a crucial equivocation is made in the 
statement of Wicks' account of dependent beauty.  When we appreciate any 
two object's teleological styles under a given concept of perfection, we must 
compare them either in respect of merely how, or of how well, each fulfills 
the purpose or function as specified by that concept of perfection.  Since 
The Intrinsicness Claim must be grounded on either of two competing 
interpretations of what the appreciation of teleological style consists in, 
Wicks faces a dilemma, each horn of which requires the denial of crucial 
theoretic desiderata.    
 
II.  WICKS' ACCOUNT OF "IMAGINATION-
CENTERED" FREE PLAY 
  
 In cases of dependent beauty, Wicks states that "[t]he kind of pleasure 
involved here is based on the free play which occurs in our imagination 
when we reflect upon the various ways to realize any given purpose, i.e., the 
process typical of imagining how to realize any plan" (Wicks 1997, p. 393). 
Following Wicks, then, let us cast the imagination as the starring agent, the 
essential role of which is to select a means to fulfill a given representational 
end.   
 How is the imagination's representational end determined?  In cases of 
dependent beauty our aesthetic judgment "presupposes" a concept of 
perfection, which in turn determines two things.  First, the presupposition of 
a given concept of perfection determines a given specification of the 
concept of kind K and, second, it determines a specification of a given end, 
E, which is in accord with, or characteristic of, things of that kind.  Here I 
assume that an end, E, is “characteristic of” things of kind K, under a given 
specification of K, iff K is End-determining.  A given kind K, is End-
determining iff a thing of kind K has, or is supposed to serve, E as its end in 
virtue of being a thing of that kind.  Now if the imagination is to realize its 
representational end, as determined by a specification of kind K, it must 
correctly represent the object’s end to be one that is characteristic of things 
of that kind.  Thus the successful realization of the imagination’s 
representational end will consist in representing its object so as to be 
appropriately subsumable to (1) the specification of kind K and (2) the 
corresponding specification of the object’s perfection, where this consists in 
representing its object to have the relevant K-determined end.   
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 There are many ways to representationally skin a cat, and if the way 
you select produces a cat unskinned, then it is a way to skin a cat.  Wicks 
recognizes this, when he says, "[i]n general, there is no 'definitive' way to 
realize a given purpose, and any imagined way to realize a given purpose is 
'perfect' insofar as it does indeed realize that given purpose" (Wicks 1997, 
p. 393).  The imagination may fulfill a given representational end in various 
ways, provided it selects a means from among an appropriate range—the 
appropriate range being prescribed by the particular concept of perfection.  
Now the appropriate range of means to a given representational end will 
coincide with the range of what Wicks calls "teleological styles."  Every 
teleological style falling into the appropriate range as determined by a given 
concept of kind K corresponds to a permissible way of instantiating that 
concept.  Let us call the appropriate range from which the imagination is 
permitted to select various means to fulfill its representational end the range 
of its subsumptive freedom. Thus the imagination's enjoyment of 
subsumptive freedom in relation to a given concept of kind K may be 
understood to constitute its enjoyment of "imagination-centered free play."  
 To see how, consider the following example.  Though it is finite, the 
appropriate range from which the imagination may select the means to 
represent an object under the concept of as an economy car does afford the 
imagination a range of subsumptive freedom. In fulfilling this 
representational end, the imagination may, but need not, represent its object 
as a Honda Hatchback, a Toyota Tercel, a Volkswagon Bug, etc.  So long as 
the imagination selects a means that is appropriately subsumable to the 
concept of an economy car, the imagination's representation of its object 
conforms to the rule determined by that concept.  In such an event, the 
imagination enjoys harmonious free play, because the imagination's act of 
representing an object as, say, a Honda Hatchback under the concept of an 
economy car is both free—in that it could have represented its object 
otherwise under that concept—and harmonious—in that its representation 
of the object is rule-governed (i.e., in conformity with the rule imposed by 
the concept of an economy car) and therefore in accord with the 
understanding's general demand for representations which are concept-
subsumable. 
 
III.  THE "HOW" VERSUS "HOW WELL" 
INTERPRETATION 
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According to Wicks' account the subject's appreciation of teleological 
style does not depend solely on the imagination's enjoyment of free play but 
also on an act of reflective comparison.  The subject who experiences 
dependent beauty does so as a result of contemplating the "contingency" of 
an actual object's structural configuration (i.e., actual teleological style).  
But such contemplation requires that the subject compare the object's actual 
configuration with various alternatives that he brings before his mind by 
means of an act of reflection.  But here Wicks equivocates in his statement 
of the respect in which the subject is to reflectively compare the object's 
actual structural configuration with various others that fall within the 
appropriate range.  Here is but one such instance:   
 
The imagination-centered free play of the cognitive faculties in response to 
the object's systematic configuration issues from our reflection upon how 
that configuration stands as one among many possible ways to realize the 
object's purpose.  Since the defined purpose of the object is an abstract 
concept, and as such can therefore never fully determine every contingent 
detail of its concrete instantiation, what we appreciate in positively judging 
the object in reference to dependent beauty is the contingency of the way 
the object realizes its purpose so very well.  In short, we appreciate the 
object's "teleological" or "functional" style when we appreciate it as a 
dependent beauty.  (Wicks 1997, pp. 392-393, emp. added)  
 
On the "how" interpretation, the subject is required to compare a given 
teleological style with, not against, another teleological style, such that none 
are regarded as better than, or superior to, any other style falling into the 
appropriate range.  On the "how well" interpretation, however, the 
comparison requires that a given teleological style be evaluated against 
various other styles and therefore that a given teleological style must 
ultimately be seen in a comparatively superior light if the subject is to 
experience any aesthetic pleasure in relation to it.   
Judging merely how an object goes about being realizing the end 
characteristic of things of kind K requires a specification of kind K and thus 
a corresponding specification of the object's K-determined end.  The 
object's K-determined end will determine the appropriate range of means—
i.e., the appropriate range of teleological styles—with which its own actual 
style may be compared.  For example, suppose that I am comparing two 
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objects—say, Honda Hatchback and a Toyota Tercel—in respect of how, 
not how well, each is an economy car.  In such a comparison, the two cars 
are not being compared against each other in reference to certain functional 
or performance criteria in order to determine which car is the superior 
economy car.  Rather, the two cars are being compared simply in respect of 
how each constitutes a different way of going about being the sort of thing it 
ought to be. By contrast, when I compare the two vehicles in respect of how 
well each goes about being an economy car, I evaluate each in reference to a 
criteria which determines how good a car of that kind each is.  Thus, in such 
cases, I am not interested in judging merely whether an individual is a way 
it is required to be to be an economy car at all but with whether and to what 
extent it is the way it must be to be a good economy car.     
 
IV.  AGAINST THE "HOW" INTERPRETATION 
 
 On Wicks' account, if the reflective subject is to make a judgment of 
dependent beauty and thus to experience some positive degree of aesthetic 
pleasure in relation to the actual object which he judges, then the 
determinate concept of perfection that is presupposed by the judgment of 
dependent beauty must offer a sufficient range of subsumptive freedom.  
Moreover, the subject must become reflectively aware of (some portion of) 
that range, such that, the subject makes a comparison of the various means 
of representing an object under the presupposed determinate concept of 
perfection, either in respect of how, or of how well, any two means fulfills 
the end of representing an object under that particular concept.  The 
imagination's enjoyment of a range of subsumptive freedom relative to a 
determinate concept of perfection is understood to constitute its enjoyment 
of free play, and the subject's reflective awareness of the imagination's free 
play is understood either to constitute, or to be causally sufficient for, the 
subject's appreciation of an item's teleological style.  Finally, the subject's 
"appreciation of teleological style," which is brought about by the reflective 
comparison of various teleological styles within an appropriately 
determined range, constitutes his experience of aesthetic pleasure.   
Under the "how" interpretation of the appreciation of teleological 
styles, the comparison of various means of representing an object under a 
determinate concept of kind K consists only in comparing how each means 
fulfills that representational end in a way which is uniquely different from, 
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but not superior to, any other means.  Provided that there is a sufficient 
range of subsumptive freedom associated with a given specification of kind 
K and provided that the imagination restricts its comparison of means (i.e., 
teleological styles) to those which fall appropriately into the particular range 
determined by that specification, then any means it considers will qualify 
equally as a permissible means of representing an object as an instance of 
that kind.  And given that each means falling into the appropriate range is a 
permissible way of representing an object as an instance of kind K, it is 
equally true of each such means, M, that, in the event the imagination 
actually selects M, various other means, M*, existed which it could have 
selected.  It follows that so long as the imagination enjoys a range of 
subsumptive freedom in representing an object under a given specification 
of the concept of kind K, then any means it actually selects from the 
appropriate range counts as a free and harmonious representational act 
because there existed various other appropriate means of representation at 
its disposal.  Thus, on all such occasions, the imagination enjoys free play.  
Consequently, since, on Wicks' account, the imagination's enjoyment of 
subsumptive freedom constitutes its enjoyment of free play, and since the 
occurrence of free play either constitutes, or is causally sufficient for, the 
experience of aesthetic pleasure, the reflective subject will experience 
aesthetic pleasure in relation to every permissible means, and thus every 
teleological style, falling within the appropriate range.   
On the how interpretation, since the comparison of any two 
teleological styles that fall appropriately within the K-determined range is 
sufficient to induce aesthetic pleasure in the reflective subject, each 
teleological style falling into that range will enjoy an equal degree of 
beauty.  Thus if we have reason to reject Crawford's account because it 
allows all instances of kind K to be located within a continuum of beauty, 
then we have even more reason to reject Wicks' account.  It is worth noting 
here that Henry Allison maintains that a sin qua non of an adequate 
aesthetic theory is that it be able to account for the phenomenon of ugliness.  
 
V.  EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENTIAL OF 
AESTHETIC PLEASURE UNDER THE "HOW" 
INTERPRETATION 
  
I have posed the question whether, when we compare any two objects' 
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teleological styles, we are to see that comparison as controlled by the idea 
of how, or how well, each realizes the exact same purpose.  If to compare x 
and y's teleological styles consists in the comparison of x and y with respect 
to merely how, not how well, they instantiate a given kind, and if any means 
counts as one in relation to which the imagination equally enjoys 
subsumptive freedom, how do we explain the difference in degrees of 
aesthetic pleasure x and y can offer?  For instance, a Porsche Boxer offers 
me an degree of aesthetic delight no Toyota Tercel ever will.  On Wicks 
account how can we explain the differential of aesthetic pleasure in such 
cases?   
Kant draws a distinction between three distinct kinds of pleasure or 
satisfaction—the agreeable, the good, and the beautiful.  To find x 
agreeable, I am required to have an inclination to, or desire for, x.  In such 
cases pleasure is grounded on the presence of some desire in my 
motivational set.  To find x good, I am required to have an end in relation to 
which x is represented as either an instrumental or constitutive means to the 
fulfillment of that end.  In these cases, pleasure is due to the fact that 
something is regarded as a means to a given end one has adopted, and in the 
event that one's end is actually realized.  If I judge an object to be beautiful, 
however, I must judge it to be so independently of whether the object 
actually exists, for my deriving aesthetic pleasure can depend neither on the 
actual satisfaction or imagined fulfillment of some desire nor on the 
realization of some end I have adopted.  When my judgment is free of all 
taint from the other two kinds of pleasure, it qualifies as "disinterested" 
judgment of taste. 
Thus if Wicks intends his theory to be an interpretation of Kant's, then 
it cannot be that what accounts for the differential of aesthetic pleasure in 
relation to the Porsche Boxer and the Toyota Tercel is that I find the former 
more agreeable than the latter.  Were Wicks to explain the difference by 
citing some feature of the vehicle, say its color or sleek "look", or anything 
that could be seen to express a capacity to take pleasure in the Porsche 
Boxer which is peculiar to me, then I could not claim a priori that, in 
relevantly similar circumstances, every relevantly similar (i.e., human) 
judger ought to conform to my judgment of taste, as Kant maintains.    
On the how interpretation, then, the difference in aesthetic pleasure 
which I experience in relation to Porsche Boxer's and Toyota Tercel's 
distinct teleological styles cannot be explained by reference to such facts as 
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concern the contingent state of the subject's motivational set.  But neither 
can the differential of aesthetic pleasure be explained by any such facts as 
would be brought to light by comparing the two vehicles in reference to a 
functional criteria for two reasons.  First, a comparison of the two vehicles 
in light of a functional or performance criteria would likely involve criteria 
which were determined by reference to a particular agent's, or group of 
agents, adopted ends (e.g., to design and/or to possess a vehicle which 
serves various ends concerned with human transportation.)  Given that the 
differential of pleasure I experience in relation to the vehicles were to be 
explained by the extent to which one car met functional criteria better than 
another, and given that such criteria were determined by reference to an 
agent's adopted ends, then the pleasure experienced in relation to them 
would not be legitimately qualify as aesthetic pleasure; consequently my 
judgment would fail to qualify as a judgment of taste because it would fail 
to be disinterested.   
Second, I could not explain the differential of aesthetic pleasure 
experienced in relation to the two vehicles by the fact that I have compared 
each in light of a functional criteria and determined that the Porsche Boxer 
meets those criteria better than the Toyota Tercel because doing so would 
involve comparing them in respect of how well each goes about fulfilling 
some definitive purpose associated with a common conception of 
perfection.  But to do so would of require that we abandon the how 
interpretation.    
 
VI.  AGAINST THE "HOW WELL INTERPRETATION 
 
Wicks states that 
 
[w]hen we appreciate an object's teleological style we do not judge 
an object's degree of perfection and rest with that.  Nor do we simply 
restrict our attention to a limited aspect of an object's configuration 
and make a judgment of free beauty within those constraints.  Rather 
we assess how the object realizes its purpose in view of the many 
alternative ways to realize that very same purpose.  (Wicks 1997, p. 
394)  
 
This citation suggests that dependent beauty as the appreciation of an 
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object's teleological style includes, but is not limited to, a judgment of 
perfection.  Thus a given judgment, J, qualifies as a judgment of dependent 
beauty iff (1) J presupposes a judgment of perfection and (2) J "assess[es] 
how the object realizes its purpose in view of the many alternative ways to 
realize that very same purpose."  Now if the assessment of the object's 
realization of its purpose is to be determined in respect of how, not how 
well, it does so, then Wicks' account leads, as shown, to the impossibility of 
ugliness; however, if the assessment of the object's realization of its purpose 
is to be determined in respect of how well, not merely how, it does so, then 
the judgment of dependent beauty reduces to the judgment of perfection, if 
no further condition is specified which is sufficient to differentiate the 
judgment of dependent beauty from the judgment of perfection.  For, on the 
how well interpretation, a judgment of dependent beauty just is—full stop—
an assessment of the degree to which a thing of kind K realizes its K-
determined end.  Since Wicks fails to provide the further sufficient 
condition that would ground the distinction between judgments of 
dependent beauty and judgments of perfection, he fails to show how the two 
kinds of judgment can be both distinct and intrinsically related; 
consequently, he fails to provide a solution to the problem of intrinsic 
relation. 
It might be suggested that we can both avoid reducing the judgment of 
dependent beauty to the judgment of perfection and maintain that the 
judgment of perfection is intrinsic to, i.e., a determining factor of, the 
judgment of dependent beauty if judging a thing’s perfection is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for judging a thing’s (dependent) beauty.  Then, 
the judgment of dependent beauty would include, but not be limited to, a 
judgment of the form “x realizes (to some positive degree) its K-determined 
end.”  
But what would be the final sufficient condition in virtue of which a 
judgment qualifies as a judgment of dependent beauty?  The final sufficient 
condition upon which judgments of dependent beauty must be grounded and 
which would differentiate such judgments from judgments of perfection is a 
Differentiating Feature, F, such that (1) the object's teleological style 
exhibits F and (2) an F-possessing object is causally sufficient to induce 
aesthetic pleasure in the reflective subject and (3) the object does not 
possess feature F solely in virtue of the degree to which it realizes its K-
determined end.  One may ask, then, in virtue of what else, if not in virtue 
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of the degree to which a thing realizes its K-determined end, does a thing of 
kind K possess the feature F?  Well, at least this much can be said:  since a 
thing of kind K cannot be an F-possessing thing even in case a thing of that 
kind maximally realizes its K-determined end, the condition sufficient for 
determining a thing’s possession of the feature F must be a teleologically-
neutral condition.  And since even the maximal realization of a thing's K-
determined end is not sufficient to endow that thing with the feature F, F 
must be a teleologically-neutral feature.   
The explanation of the difference between judgments of perfection 
and of dependent beauty by reference to a teleologically-neutral feature has 
three things to recommend it.  If it is accepted, then we avoid The Crawford 
Problem, and the problems afflicting Wicks’ account under the “how” and 
the “how well” interpretations.  However one may well wonder whether a 
teleologically-neutral feature could also serve as a solution to the problem 
of intrinsic relation.  For, since we want to show how this—judging the 
degree to which a thing of kind K realizes its K-determined end—explains 
this—why we judge a thing of kind K to be beautiful, and since according to 
the suggested explanation, judging the degree to which a thing of kind K 
realizes its K-determined end is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 
for judging a thing’s (dependent) beauty, an explanatory gulf remains 
between our account of the judgment of perfection and the determining 
factor that is sufficient for the experience of (dependent) beauty.   
It is difficult to see how, if modified as suggested, Wicks’ account 
would be substantially different from Guyer’s account, according to which a 
judgment of free beauty is made within certain parameters imposed by a 
prior judgment of perfection.  So since Wicks intends his account to offer a 
solution to the problem of intrinsic relation and therefore to be superior to 
Guyer’s account in this respect, Wicks is not free to claim that the judgment 
of dependent beauty is “intrinsically related” to the judgment of perfection 
iff the latter kind of judgment is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 
for the former kind.  Nor is Wicks free to claim that the judgment of 
dependent beauty is “intrinsically related” to the judgment of perfection iff 
the latter kind of judgment is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
former kind.  For were he do so, his account would reduce the judgment of 
dependent beauty to the judgment of perfection and subsequently fail to 
avoid The Crawford Problem.    
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that Wicks equivocates in the statement of what takes 
place in the reflective comparison of teleological styles.  When one 
compares any two teleological styles, one may compare them in respect of 
how, or in respect of how well, each realizes the common end each has as a 
thing of kind K.  But the Kantle can't be burned at both Wicks:  either he 
must adopt the how interpretation of dependent beauty and is subsequently 
saddled with the empirically false claim that all things are equally beautiful; 
or he must adopt the "how well" interpretation and reduce the judgment of 
dependent beauty to the judgment of perfection.  But both Kant and Wicks 
agree that making a judgment of dependent beauty is not the same thing as 
making a judgment of goodness of kind.   
If, to avoid the unwanted reduction, Wicks asserts that the judgment 
of perfection includes but is not limited to the judgment of perfection and 
then say that the distinguishing feature of judgments of dependent beauty is 
that its determining ground is a teleologically-neutral feature, then Wicks 
cannot claim that judgments of dependent beauty essentially consist in the 
appreciation of a thing's telelogical style.  Suppose, again, that what is 
sufficient to differentiate judgments of dependent beauty from judgments of 
perfection is that the former must satisfy a teleogically-neutral condition.  
How can dependent beauty essentially consist in the appreciation of 
teleological style if what makes a thing (dependently) beautiful is its 
possessing a teleologically-neutral feature? In other words, how can the 
appreciation of (a thing's) teleological style be constitutive of (a thing's) 
dependent beauty, if the judgment of dependent beauty is determined by 
teleologically-neutral feature?
1
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